AI inventory and risk classification
Inventory models and agents by workload, impact, autonomy, and data sensitivity.
It is the design of who may see what, which actions they may take, and how the result can be proven.
Patty does not reduce AI safety to tone or a forbidden-word list. We connect identity and authority, data boundaries, tool use, human approval, and execution evidence as one operating system. As AI takes on more work, organizational control must grow with it.
Request a security and governance reviewPublishing an AI usage policy does not reveal which data reached a model, which system an agent changed, or who approved that authority. Once AI moves beyond retrieval to sending messages, deploying code, or updating a business system, retrospective logs are insufficient.
Our principle is straightforward: narrow risky actions before execution, let permitted actions proceed within their scope, and preserve decisions and outcomes as evidence people can understand. Governance is an operating mechanism for trustworthy speed.
A plausible model response is not execution authority. Each step inherits the preceding scope and pauses when broader permission is required.
Distinguish people, service accounts, and AI agents, then bind them to organization, role, and session.
actor · organization · sessionState purpose, target, allowed actions, validity, and whether redelegation is permitted.
purpose · scope · expiryProvide only data allowed by sensitivity, residency, business context, and field-level scope.
classification · residency · fieldsSelect allowed models, versions, connectors, and tool capabilities through policy.
model · version · toolObtain an accountable decision for external transfer, high-risk change, overspend, or other defined boundaries.
approver · reason · validityPerform only the approved action against approved targets in an isolated execution environment.
action · target · before/afterJoin the request, policy decision, approval, result, and time into a reviewable record.
decision · outcome · timestampTrust emerges when organization, data, models, tools, people, and operations work together.
Inventory models and agents by workload, impact, autonomy, and data sensitivity.
Identify people, agents, and service accounts and connect each action to responsibility.
Issue purpose-, target-, action-, and time-bounded grants instead of broad permanent access.
Apply purpose, minimization, sensitivity, retention, residency, and deletion requirements at runtime.
Let people approve, stop, or reverse consequential decisions without creating approval fatigue.
Control versions, plugin provenance, change history, allowlists, and unexpected code execution.
Preserve links among inputs, sources, policy decisions, approvals, execution, and artifacts.
Repeat monitoring, red teaming, incident response, evidence preservation, recovery, and improvement.
Failure includes exploitation of goals, context, authority, tools, and trust between agents—not only an unusual answer.
Separate trust boundaries · protect system instructions · restrict actions
Goal drift · anomalous tool calls
Stop session · discard tainted context · review again
Separate capabilities · least privilege · high-risk approval
Policy denials · call patterns · budget anomalies
Revoke authority · undo change · determine impact
Strong identity · purpose-bound grants · redelegation control
Actor-authority mismatch · abnormal path
Revoke credentials · block delegation chain · investigate
Provenance labels · version pinning · supply-chain allowlist
Integrity checks · regression evaluation
Restore safe version · isolate memory · reevaluate
Mutual identity · non-transferable authority · message schemas
Chained calls · broken accountability
Isolate workflow · reconstruct state · involve owner
Sandbox · network boundary · staged commit
Execution observation · outcome validation · stop conditions
Checkpoint · rollback · emergency stop
Evidence, diff, and impact first · independent review
Rubber-stamp patterns · abnormal review time
Revisit decision · notify impact · improve approval policy
Raw logs are ingredients. Begin with who did what, why, and with what result; descend to technical fields and source records when the review demands it.
Nature of this exampleThis synthetic receipt demonstrates the evidence structure. It is not a record of a real customer, person, production environment, or production execution.
A synthetic procurement-role scenario requests 12 purchase-order drafts. A fictional team-owner approval and sensitive-field exclusion policy allow draft creation only; the ERP source remains unchanged.
trc_8f2a…4c19del_0137…b28esha256:53b7…e20aprocurement-kr@2026.08.4private-seoul-02sha256:94e1…72dfEffective human oversight calls for judgment where it matters and presents the context, impact, and alternatives needed to decide.
Obligations vary by role, industry, deployment, and applicability. We map them to inventory, impact assessment, transparency, oversight, records, monitoring, and response.
Important distinctionThis section describes readiness and control mapping. Mapping is not legal advice, a conformity assessment, certification, or a guarantee of complete compliance. Applicability and adequacy must be determined with the organization’s legal, privacy, security, and audit owners.
Connect transparency, high-impact identification, risk management, explanation, human oversight, documentation, and impact assessment to operating evidence.
View primary source ↗PIPC Generative AI guidanceReview purpose, minimization, data-subject rights, and privacy risk across planning, training, development, and operation.
View primary source ↗NIST AI RMF and GenAI ProfileConnect GOVERN, MAP, MEASURE, and MANAGE to iterative inventory, risk, evaluation, monitoring, and incident response.
View primary source ↗ISO/IEC 42001Review responsibility, objectives, risk, impact, operating controls, and improvement as an AI management system.
View primary source ↗EU AI ActReview risk classification, provider and deployer roles, transparency, records, oversight, and high-risk requirements in context.
View primary source ↗Deployment is not a simple security ranking. Control placement and evidence retention follow data class, network conditions, operating responsibility, and recovery requirements.
A boundary that may include managed infrastructure and external model APIs
Enterprise VPC, dedicated account, or internal infrastructure
A boundary reflecting jurisdictional data and operator requirements
An internet-isolated or tightly connected network
Models, data, tools, attacks, and work change. Trust is managed as a repeated capacity to observe, validate, respond, and recover.
Test representative work, failure conditions, Korean instructions, and authority boundaries by version.
Probe prompt injection, escalation, exfiltration, tool misuse, and cascading failure.
Monitor denials, approval bypass attempts, cost or latency anomalies, goal drift, and result quality.
Prepare stopping, isolation, revocation, evidence preservation, impact analysis, and notification.
Return to a safe version or checkpoint and replace tainted context and credentials.
Feed incidents and near misses back into policy, evaluation, approval criteria, and product design.
DARI and Patty’s security work explore how these principles can be implemented and tested. The product name does not precede the doctrine, but technical reviewers can inspect the basis.
Research on connecting identity, delegation, policy decisions, and action outcomes in a verifiable flow.
→C2PA is an important open standard for the origin and change history of digital content. Execution provenance additionally asks who used which authority and policy to invoke a tool and what changed in a real system. The concerns are related but not identical.
We will map the models, data classes, tools, approval boundaries, and deployment environment to the controls and evidence your organization needs.